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Now that the history of the Religious Right has been discussed, it is time to examine this phenomenon as it exists today.
Many people today are ignorant about the numbers and views of the Religious Right and tend to dismiss it as a phenomenon confined to some areas. This view could not be farther from the truth. The Religious Right is not only extremely numerous and powerful, its numbers are, in fact, growing. In 1979, according to the Gallup poll, 40% of America's population considered themselves "‘born-again' Evangelical Christians".1 By 1994, this number had increased to 42%.2 Finally, in December 2002, 46% of Americans identified themselves as evangelical or born-again Christians.3 Of those people, the vast majority live in the South (63.7%) and the Midwest (24.3%).4 Most of the born-again evangelical Christians come from rural areas, lower socio-economic background (under $30,000), and tend to be less educated (most of them did not attend college).5
Most evangelical Christians tend to support the Republican Party (38.6%). It is also interesting that a large number of them tend to be Independent (30.1%)(Utter and Storey, The Religious Right:…, p. 82). Nonetheless, most of the Religious Right tend to support conservative candidates. This is confirmed by surveys that state that 50% of the evangelical Christians consider themselves conservative, and 30% think of themselves as "moderate" (Utter and Storey, The Religious Right:…, p. 83). This shows that most evangelicals today tend to support conservative candidates. In fact, many of them think that liberalism equals to Communism (Banuchi, "How Shall I Vote?").
The Religious Right's support for conservative candidates undoubtedly comes from the conservative attitudes of its members towards most social issues. For example, 81 percent of evangelical Christians believe that marijuana should not be legalized, a belief held by only 48 % of non-evangelicals (Utter and Storey, The Religious Right:…, p. 87). Their attitudes towards premarital sex are similarly conservative. 86 % of them believe that premarital sex is "always wrong", and 12% believe that it's "almost always" wrong (Utter and Storey, The Religious Right:…, p. 87). In addition, 63% of evangelicals believe that homosexuality is a matter of choice, a belief held by only 27% of non-evangelicals (Utter and Storey, The Religious Right:…, p. 89).
In addition to holding conservative beliefs on social issues, most members of the Religious Right hold a firm belief that American society must be changed to reflect Christian values. When surveyed on this issue, 92% of Evangelical Christians and 87% of Fundamentalist Christians said that American society should be changed to better reflect God's will (Smith, American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving, p.37). When asked about strategies that can be used to accomplish this, 91% of evangelicals and fundamentalists said that converting people to Jesus Christ is "very important," and 9% of Evangelicals and 8% of Fundamentalists said that it was "somewhat important" (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 38). In addition, 97% of evangelicals and 96% of fundamentalists said it was important that Christians live a way of life that is "radically different from mainstream America". Also, 98% of evangelicals thought that it was important to work for political reforms in the US, and 95% of fundamentalists agreed with them. In addition, 96% of evangelicals and 95% of fundamentalists thought that they must defend a Biblical worldview in intellectual circles (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 38). Other methods of changing America are giving money to charity (supported by 92% of evangelicals and 89% of fundamentalists), and volunteering for local community organizations (supported by all evangelicals surveyed and by 98% of fundamentalists) (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 38).
In addition to believing that action is necessary, many members of the Religious Right have actually contributed time and money to their cause. 92 percent of evangelicals vote in every election (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 41), and a great deal of evangelicals and fundamentalists participate in activities described in the paragraph above. Table 1 of this paper, which is a copy of a part of Table 2.6, which is found in Christian Smith's book on page 40, describes this in greater detail:
| Table 1: Religious Activism in Previous Two Years (percent). | ||
| Evangelicals | Fundamentalists | |
| Given Money or Time to Help Spread the Gospel in US or Overseas: | ||
| A lot | 51 | 35 |
| Some | 41 | 49 |
| None | 8 | 16 |
| Told Others About How to Become a Christian: | ||
| A lot | 32 | 25 |
| Some | 56 | 61 |
| None | 12 | 14 |
| Defended a Biblical Worldview in Intellectual Circles: | ||
| A lot | 44 | 38 |
| Some | 48 | 45 |
| None | 8 | 17 |
| Volunteered for a Church Program That Serves the Local Community: | ||
| A lot | 32 | 26 |
| Some | 47 | 46 |
| None | 21 | 28 |
| Worked Hard to Set a Christian Example: | ||
| A lot | 82 | 73 |
| Some | 16 | 26 |
| None | 2 | 1 |
There are several theories that try to explain the vitality of religion in America. The first theory is the Sheltered Enclave Theory.; It was developed by James Davison Hunter in the 1980s. According to this theory, religions are relatively cohesive moral orders, which are "constituted and bounded by their distinctive cognitive content and symbolic boundaries" (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 68). Therefore, a religious tradition is not merely an organized population of people who share the same religious belief, but is a "socially maintained sacredly defined cultural milieu that sustains a distinct worldview or ‘sacred cosmos'" (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 68). Therefore, according to this theory, the force that threatens the religious enclave the most is the force of modernization, and things that accompany it: functional rationality, cultural pluralism, and structural pluralism (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 68). This theory thus says that a religious community can maintain its strong beliefs and prevent assimilation into the modern world only by isolating itself from modern society and its technology.
The flaws of this theory are obvious. It fails to explain the political and religious activism of the Religious Right, and the vast involvement of its leaders in politics and social life.
Another theory that attempts to explain religious vitality in America is the Status Discontent Theory. This theory was originally developed to explain right-wing political extremism, but "theories of status discontent have evolved over the years into explanations for a broader array of religious and political phenomena (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 70). According to this theory's latest proponent, Lester Thurow:
The rise of religious fundamentalism is a social volcano in eruption. Its connection to economics is simple. Those who lose out economically or who cannot stand the economic uncertainty of not knowing what it takes to succeed in the new era ahead retreat into religious fundamentalism. (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 70).
Another theory that attempts to explain religious fundamentalism in America is the Strictness Theory. In short, this theory argues that "strict" religious groups thrive, while "lenient" religious groups do not (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 71). There are two different theories why this happens. One theory was developed by Dean Kelley and states that "the business of religion is meaning", and that religions will only thrive when they can deliver substantial meaning to their adherents (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 71). They produce this "meaning" by demanding that their followers by demanding that their followers respond to their ideas by committing their time, money, energy, reputations, and their very selves in a way that validates those ideas. Therefore, this view, put simply is "meaning = concept + demand" (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 71). Strict religions, according to Kelly, provide their followers with meaning because they are demanding, while "lenient" religions do not (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 72).
The second theory, developed by Laurence Iannaccone, uses economics to explain why strict religions thrive while lenient ones do not. He argues that stricter religions thrive because they screen out "free riders"– people who enjoy many of the benefits of the religious group, while contributing almost nothing to it. Therefore, strict religious groups enjoy high degrees of commitment, while lenient religious groups are full of free riders who want to take a lot more than they give, thus causing the religious group to decline (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 72).
Another theory that attempts to explain religious vitality in America is the Competitive Marketing Theory of Roger Finke and Rodney Stark. This theory's basic claim is that religious regulation and monopolies create lethargic religions, but that capable religions thrive in pluralistic and competitive environments (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 73). According to this theory, capable religions thrive because their religious "entrepreneurs" capitalize on unregulated religious environments to aggressively market their religions to new "consumers". Thus, religious "firms" (denominations and traditions) that possess superior organizational structures (denominational polities), sales representatives (evangelists and clergy), products (religious messages), and marketing (evangelistic) techniques flourish, while those that cannot successfully compete decline numerically (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 73).
Finally, there is the "Subcultural Identity" Theory developed by Christian Smith himself. This theory states that religious fundamentalism has thrived in America because of its struggle with the pluralistic modernity (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 88). This theory argues that evangelicalism "capitalizes on its culturally pluralistic environment to socially construct subcultural distinction, engagement, and tension between itself and relevant outgroups, and that enhances evangelicalism's religious strength" (Smith, American Evangelicalism…, p. 153)
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1Martin, With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America, p. 221
2Utter and Storey, The Religious Right: A Reference Handbook, p. 79
3Kristof, "God, Satan and The Media", p. A25
4Utter and Storey, The Religious Right: A Reference Handbook, p. 81
5Ibid, p. 79
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